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Abstract—It is getting popular that customers make use of
third party data service providers to store their data and emails.
It is common to have a large server shared by many different
users. This creates a big problem for forensic investigation. It may
not be easy to clone a copy of data from the storage device(s)
due to the huge volume of data. Even if it is possible to make a
clone, there are many irrelevant information/data stored in the
same device for which the investigators have no right to access.
The other alternative is to let the service provider search the
relevant information and retrieve the data for the investigator
provided a warrant can be provided. However, sometimes, due
to the confidentiality of the crime, the investigator may not want
the service provider to know what information they are looking
for or the service provider herself may be one of the suspects.
The problem becomes even more obvious in terms of cloud
computing technology. In this paper, we address this problem and
using homomorphic encryption and commutative encryption, we
provide two forensically sound schemes to solve the problem so
that the investigators can obtain the necessary evidence while the
privacy of other users can be protected and at the same time, the
service provider cannot know what information the investigators
are interested in.
Keywords-privacy preserving forensics; search on encrypted
data; homomorphic encryption; commutative encryption
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there is an increasing number of computer
and cyber crimes. It becomes a serious problem for businesses,
the public, and government. How to capture digital evidence
is critical for counteracting against computer crimes. On the
other hand, it is getting popular that users do not host the
data themselves, but make use of a third data service provider
to store their data and/or emails. It is common to have a
large server shared by many different users. This increases the
difficulty of forensic investigation. The problem becomes even
more difficult if we are talking about the cloud technology
since the data is stored in a distributed manner and may
*This work is partially supported by “the Fundamental Research Funds for
the Central Universities” (06108041).
involve a large number of servers and storage devices. The
storage devices may be remote as well. It is quite obvious
that traditional forensic technique may not be applied easily.
For example, it may be difficult to clone a “copy” of data from
the storage device(s) due to the huge volume of data and the
distributed manner of the storage device(s).
Even if it is feasible to make a clone, there are many
irrelevant information/data stored in the same device for which
the investigators have no right to access. This data may involve
confidential information and private information. The other
alternative is to let the service provider search the relevant
information and retrieve the data for the investigator provided
a warrant can be provided. However, sometimes, due to the
confidentiality of the crime, the investigator may not want the
service provider to know what information they are looking
for or the service provider herself may be one of the suspects.
In this paper, we address this problem and using homo-
morphic encryption and commutative encryption, we provide
two forensically sound schemes to solve the problem so that
the investigators can obtain the necessary evidence while the
privacy of other users can be protected and at the same
time, the service provider cannot know what information the
investigators are interested in. So far, there is no forensically
sound solution to solve this problem.
We assume that the evidence required by the investigator
is stored together with a huge amount of irrelevant data on a
remote server or a distributed set of storage devices. It is not
possible to make a clone of all data. The service provider is
willing to cooperate and search the relevant information for
the investigator. However, they want to make sure that only
relevant information will be given to the investigator, no other
information of other users will be disclosed to the investigator.
At the same time, the investigator does not want the service
provider to know what information they are searching. We
further assume that the service provider is trustable in the sense
that he will not hide any information if it satisfies the searching
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criteria of the investigator. In other words, the service provider
will give out all the information located.
Our main idea is as follows. The server administrator will
encrypt all the data stored on the server for preventing the
investigator from learning the irrelevant data; the investigator
will provide the administrator keywords (which are in an
encrypted form for preventing the administrator from learning
the investigation subject) and the “trapdoor” so that the ad-
ministrator can search for the relevant data from the encrypted
data; the administrator will only return the relevant data to the
investigator and the investigator will only decrypt and perform
investigation on such relevant data for capturing the evidence.
There are a number of studies on searching for data without
revealing its content to the server (sometimes called the
“database” that stores data), but the problems that they try
to tackle are different from ours. We group the major existing
work into private database search (database data belong to the
data owner who wishes to retrieve data) and public database
search (database data is public such as stock quotes and
someone who is not data owner wishes to retrieve data).
1) Private database search includes two kinds of scenar-
ios:
• Searching on private-key-encrypted data (Shortly,
SSKE, [1][2][3]). The problem of SSKE was raised
for the first time by Song et al. [1]. In the setting of
SSKE, a user wishes to store his private data to a
remote server while preventing the untrusted server
administrator from learning the data. One solution
is that the user himself encrypts the data before
storing. However, it is difficult for the administrator
to help the user retrieve his data later as it is in
an encrypted form. In order to efficiently retrieve
or search on the encrypted data, the user can orga-
nize his data in an arbitrary way before encryption
and attach additional data structures such as secure
indexes [4], capability [5] and hash functions/hash
tables [6] [7], etc. Such additional data structures are
also encrypted and stored on the server alongside
the encrypted data, which are helpful to improve
searching efficiency since each of them is associated
with the encrypted data.
• Searching on public-key-encrypted data (Shortly,
SPKE, [8][9][10][11]). In the setting of SPKE, the
user wants to retrieve his e-mails containing a cer-
tain keyword from the mail server, where the e-mails
are encrypted by the senders using his public key.
Anyone with access to the public key can encrypt
the email but only the owner of the private key
can generate “trapdoors” to perform retrieval and
decryption. Different from the setting of SSKE, the
data is encrypted by the senders and collected by the
mail server, so the user cannot organize the data in
any convenient way. The additional data structures
are also introduced in the SPKE ([10][11]) for
improving the searching efficiency and security.
2) Public database search Private information retrieval
(Shortly, PIR, [12][13]) schemes allow a user to retrieve
records from a database without revealing what records
were retrieved and with total communication less than
the data size. The original PIR scheme [12] allows the
user to retrieve a record of the database only by address,
which was extended to keyword searching including
searching on streaming data [14]. Unlike the above two
settings, the data in PIR is always unencrypted and any
scheme that tries to hide the access pattern must touch
all data items. Otherwise, the database will learn access
pattern, namely, that the untouched item was not of
interest to the user. Thus, the user needs to download
records that he is not interested in. Consequently, com-
munication cost is increased.
Our problem does not fit either of the two settings men-
tioned above. Unlike the private database search, the in-
vestigator is neither data owner nor receiver of data so he
cannot manage the data in any convenient way. Moreover, he
is only allowed to investigate the relevant data instead of the all
for protecting the privacy of innocent data. Unlike the public
database search, keywords derived from the investigation
subject and server data need to be in an encrypted form for
protecting the privacy on both sides: investigation subject and
innocent data. We summarize the difference between our work
and the existing work in TABLE I.
In this paper, based on the homomorphic encryption and
commutative encryption schemes, we will present two foren-
sically sound proposals to assist the investigator in searching
for evidence efficiently without exposing irrelevant data to
the investigator. The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. In Section II, we make assumptions to formulate our
problem and clarify its requirements. Section III presents the
first proposal based on homomorphic encryption. The second
one which is based on commutative encryption is stated in
Section IV. Finally, discussions are conducted and conclusions
are drawn in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We make the following assumptions.
1) The investigator and the administrator do not trust each
other. To prevent the administrator (who may be a po-
tential suspect) from learning the investigation subject,
the investigator will provide the administrator keywords
which are in an encrypted form. To prevent the inves-
tigator from obtaining innocent data, the administrator
will verify what keywords are used later. For example,
during the evidence presentation in a court of law, the
investigator can be required to show what evidence is
collected based on what keywords, so the administrator
can check whether the investigator cheated for obtaining
other information from the server.
2) Evidential data is stored alongside the innocent data on a
remote server in non-encrypted form. For simplicity, we
view the data as a set of documents and each document
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Problem Setting Procedures
SSKE data owner wishes to outsource his private data to (untrusted) server data owner encrypts the data and
server performs the search on encrypted data
SPKE receiver of emails wishes to manage his emails on (untrusted) server senders of emails encrypt emails and
server performs the search on encrypted emails
PIR user wishes to query database without revealing query and results user queries unencrypted database data using
oblivious transfer technologies, etc.
Our Work investigator can efficiently capture evidence without revealing innocent data server administrator encrypts the data and
performs the search on encrypted data
TABLE I
W is a series of word blocks which has fixed length as
follows:
· · · wi−1 wi wi+1 · · ·
We assume that each keyword specified by the investi-
gator has the same length as wi.
3) It is difficult to distinguish the relevant data from the
irrelevant ones. We view the documents containing the
specified keywords as relevant data and those without
containing the specified keywords as irrelevant ones.
Then, the investigator is only allowed to perform in-
vestigation on documents which contain the specified
keywords.
4) Both the keywords and the data stored on the server
are encrypted by the cryptographic scheme, which is
assumed to be provably secure in the sense that the
server administrator cannot learn anything about the
specified keywords when they are encrypted and the
investigator cannot learn more than the search result.
The search result must contain the specified keywords,
so the investigator can treat them as potential evidence.
We formulate our problem in TABLE II.
A scheme which satisfies the following properties is desirable for our problem.
Inputs Investigator w∗: specified keyword
Server administrator D: whole set of server-side documents
Outputs Investigator Nothing
Server administrator W (∈ D): document involving w∗
Privacy Investigator Server administrator cannot learn w∗
Server administrator Investigator cannot learn more than W
TABLE II
To protect the privacy on both sides: investigator and server
administrator, the keyword w∗ and the documents D need to
be encrypted. This will lead to a non-index, sequential search
on the entire server. Besides, public key encryption is required.
Both the investigator and the server administrator can perform
encryption but only the one who owns private key can perform
decryption.
III. A SCHEME BASED ON HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
After an event involving computer crime has occurred, the
investigator or the police usually search for evidence over all
the documents stored on the server. However, as the data is
irrelevant to the crimes and contains confidential information
or privacy information, data owners may be unwilling to
reveal it to the investigator. Data owners usually trust the
administrator who is responsible for managing the data in a
secure manner. Hence, the alternative is to let the administrator
perform the searching and only return the relevant data to
the investigator. Take the company server as an example, if
there are only a few employees suspected, the administrator
usually provides the investigator their data rather than all
the employees’ data. Here, we assume that the administrator
honestly returns all the searching results without holding some
of them.
In our first scheme, the investigator encrypts the specified
keyword w∗ for preventing the administrator from learning the
investigation subject and the administrator encrypts the whole
set of documents D with the public key of the investigator
for the sake of searching; the administrator uses the encrypted
keyword w∗ to search on the encrypted set D and only returns
the relevant encrypted document W to the investigator. As
shown on Fig. 1, the upper half part is what the administrator
performs while the lower half part is what the investigator
performs. As a result, the investigator can avoid investigating
what he is not interested in and the privacy of innocent data
can also be protected from revealing. Besides, neither the
keywords nor the search results can be decrypted by the server
administrator since he does not know the private key. We
realize “searching on encrypted data with encrypted keyword”
by utilizing the homomorphic encryption, which can help
perform searching on ciphertext.
A. Homomorphic Encryption
The most common definition of homomorphic encryption
([15]) is the following.
Definition 1: Let M (resp., C) denote the set of plaintexts
(resp., ciphertexts). An encryption scheme is said to be ho-
momorphic if for any given encryption key k the encryption
function E satisfies
∀ m1,m2 ∈ M, E(m1 M m2) ← E(m1)C E(m2) (1)
for some operators M in M and C in C, where “←”
means “can be directly computed from”, that is, without any
intermediate decryption.
From this definition it follows that, given a fixed key, per-
forming operations M on the plaintexts before encryption is
equivalent to performing operations C on the corresponding
ciphertexts after encryption.
380
Fig. 1. Searching on Encrypted Data with Encrypted Keyword
Fig. 2. Paillier cryptosystem in [15]
B. Paillier cryptosystem
The Paillier cryptosystem is named after and invented by
Pascal Paillier in 1999 [16], which is a public key cryptogra-
phy shown in Fig. 2. Without special remarks, we adopt the
notations in [15] directly in the rest of paper.
The Paillier cryptosystem works based on the function
εg :Zn×Z∗n→Z∗n2 , which maps (m, r)→gm·rn. A notable fea-
ture of the Paillier cryptosystem is its additive homomorphic
properties: D(E(m1) · E(m2) mod n2)=m1 + m2 mod n,
where D is the decryption function. Our first scheme is based
on the Paillier cryptosystem.
C. Details of Scheme
Suppose that the investigator inputs the keyword w∗
and the administrator inputs the set of documents D =
{W 1,W 2, . . . ,WL}. With Paillier cryptosystem, the investi-
gator encrypts the keyword w∗ for preventing the administrator
from learning the investigation subject by
E(w∗) = gw
∗ · rn mod n2 (2)
where r is random number for semantic security. The ad-
ministrator encrypts the each word block wi of document W
(W∈D) by
E(wi) = g
wi · rni = gwi mod n2 (3)
where the random number ri is taken as 1. It is reasonable to
set ri=1 since we assume that data owners trust the server
administrator and the data is encrypted for preventing the
investigator rather than the administrator from learning the
innocent data. It follows that
δi =
E(w∗)
E(wi)
=
gw
∗ · rn
gwi
= rn mod n2 only if w∗ = wi (4)
The administrator can identify w∗ = wi by testing if the δi
is an n-th power, which can be realized by zero knowledge
proof as follows:
1) The investigator chooses a random number ρ∈Z∗n, com-
putes aρ=ρn mod n2 and sends aρ to the administrator;
2) The administrator chooses a random bit string S of
length e and sends S to the investigator, where S<2e
and 2e< min(p, q);
3) The investigator computes μ = ρ · rS mod n and sends
μ to the administrator;
4) The administrator verifies if μn=aρ·δSi mod n2, where
μn=(ρ · rS)n=ρn · rnS mod n2 only if δi=rn mod n2
is true, in other words, μn=aρ·δSi mod n2 holds only
if w∗ = wi.
After identifying w∗ = wi both of which are in an encrypted
form, the administrator returns the investigator E(W ) which
contains E(w∗). The above is constant-round zero knowledge
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proof, so the investigator and administrator can prepare the
parameters (such as aρ, S and μ) in advance for the sake of
efficiency. In addition, the purpose of the search is to find
documents which contain a specific word, where the position
and the number of occurrences are not relevant in our proposal.
So, as long as that δi is an n-th power is identified, the
server administrator will stop searching on this document and
continue to search on next document.
IV. A SCHEME BASED ON COMMUTATIVE ENCRYPTION
In the above scheme, we must trust the server administrator
to return all the searching results. If the server administrator
returns only some (but not all) of the searching results, the
investigator will have no way to detect this. Until now, we
assume that the administrator does not misbehave in this way
and trustable in this sense.
We can eliminate such assumption by introducing a Trusted
Third Party (TTP), which is in charge of searching and super-
vising the server administrator returning all the search results.
Suppose that pI and pA are public keys of the investigator and
the server administrator, respectively. We write Ek(m) for the
result of encrypting m with k and define that EpI and EpA
are commutative encryption if
EpA(EpI (m)) = EpI (EpA(m)) (5)
holds for any plaintext m. Our second scheme is based on
such commutative encryption and the detail is the following.
1) To keep the investigation subject secret from the TTP,
the investigator uses pI to encrypt the keyword w∗ and
provides the TTP the encrypted keyword EpI (w
∗);
2) To keep the server data secret from the TTP, the server
administrator uses pA to encrypt the document W and
provides TTP the encrypted document EpA(W ) which
has the following form:
· · · EpA(wi−1) EpA(wi) EpA(wi+1) · · ·
3) The TTP encrypts EpI (w
∗) with pA to obtain
EpA(EpI (w
∗)) and encrypts EpA(wi) with pI to ob-
tain EpI (EpA(wi)). As EpI and EpA are commuta-
tive encryption, EpA(EpI (w
∗)) and EpI (EpA(wi)) will
be equal if w∗=wi; without knowing the values of
w∗ and wi, the TTP compares EpA(EpI (w
∗)) with
EpI (EpA(wi)); As the two values are equal, the TTP
will supervise the administrator decrypting the docu-
ment EpI (EpA(W )) (=EpA(EpI (W )) which contains
the specified keyword w∗ and returning the relevant
EpI (W ) to the investigator.
4) The investigator decrypts EpI (W ) with his private key
and investigate W for capturing the evidence. That
is, the investigator performs investigation only on the
relevant data.
We construct commutative encryption based on matrix
polynomial (i.e., a polynomial with matrices as variables) in
Zq[x], where q is a large prime. For example, let h(x)=a0 +
a1x + . . . + anx
n ∈ Znq [x] is a polynomial in x, where
a0,a1,. . .,an are constants. We can easily obtain a matrix
polynomial h(A)=a0I + a1A+ . . .+ anAn mod q, where A
is a square matrix and I is the identity matrix with the same
size of A. Obviously, the multiplication of any two matrix
polynomials is commutative.
We take the investigator as an example to demonstrate the
procedures of encryption and decryption. The investigator can
select a polynomial f(x)∈ Znq [x] and a square matrix R to
compute f(R), where f(R) is invertible and its inverse is
denoted by f(R)−1. Not all the matrices have an inverse and
the inverse of f(R) is very hard to evaluate as the size of
matrix is large, that is where some elementary linear algebra
comes in. So the investigator can take f(R) and f(R)−1 as
his public key pI and private key sI respectively. Rewrite the
plaintext m in a vector or matrix form and the investigator
performs the encryption by computing
c = EpI (m) = Ef(R)(m) = f(R)m mod q (6)
and performs the decryption by computing
m = EsI (c) = Ef(R)−1(c) = f(R)
−1
c mod q (7)
Similarly, the administrator can also select a polynomial
g(x)∈ Znq [x] and a square matrix T (with same size of R)
to make g(T ) invertible, and then perform the encryption
and decryption. It is obvious that f(R)g(T )=g(T )f(R) holds,
which means such encryption is commutative.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
A. Discussion
To improve the efficiency in forensic investigation, the
investigator is supposed to capture evidence only from the rel-
evant data in our proposals. Through searching for encrypted
keywords (specified by investigation subject) on encrypted
data (stored on the server), we realized that the investigator
can search for evidence without learning any information of
irrelevant data and the server administrator cannot learn the
investigation subject. Obviously, whether the privacy on both
sides can be completely protected relies on the security of
cryptosystem.
In the above two schemes, we assumed that the file can
be easily broken into a sequence of words of a fixed length.
However, this assumption might not be true in a normal file. To
deal with variable-length words, we can pick a fixed-size block
that is long enough to contain most words like the work [1],
where words that are too short or too long may be padded to a
multiple of the block size with some pre-determined padding
format.
B. Conclusions
Based on homomorphic encryption and commutative en-
cryption, we presented two schemes to assist investigators in
searching for evidence efficiently without exposing innocent
data to the investigators. For future work, we will consider
how to implement them and verify their feasibility.
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